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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLENE CALL 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN E. KEITER, M.D., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20090051 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jury verdict was signed January 22, 2008.x Defendant John E. Keiter, M.D.'s 
Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for a New Trial was filed 
February 29, 2008.2 A judgment was entered March 6, 2008,3 and an amended judgment, 
correcting an error in the amount of future economic damages, was entered April 4, 2008.4 
Dr. Keiter's post-judgment motions were denied by the Order on Pending Motions entered 
lR. 1215-1217. 
2R. 1287-1289. 
3R. 1352-1354. 
4R. 1419-1425. 
1 
December 3, 2008.5 Dr. Keiter had filed his initial Notice of Appeal on March 31, 2008,6 
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on appeal on December 9, 2008,7 and a Second 
Amended Notice of Appeal on December 26, 2008.8 The amended notices of appeal were 
within 30 days of the denial of the post-judgment motions and were timely.9 The Utah 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78 A-3-102(3 )(j), and this Court has pour-
over jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Where a physician commits acts of negligence, is a timely claim for damages 
caused by those negligent acts barred solely because there were prior negligent acts for which 
no claim for damages was made? 
Standard of review: "The application of a statute of limitations is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness."10 
5R. 1801-1803. 
6R. 1415-1417. 
7R. 1804-1806. 
8R. 1807-1809. 
9Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2). 
10Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998). Accord Salt Lake County v. W. 
Dairymen Coop., 2002 UT 39, \ 16,48 P.3d 910,915; Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 
(Utah 1990). 
2 
Preservation below: Mrs. Call agrees with Dr. Keiter 's statement thai tins issiin1 w ,is 
properly raised below. 
2. ': •; _, .wi^v.icni iactUcu and legal basiN for the trial court to 
submit the issue of alloc alii HIM il lault ivi»<mhnj> th< IIIIMPIH I pi.ml IHHII MLS I '" 
Standard of review: '"The applicability of 'the comparative fault provisions of Ihr 
i. * a -M i u v Kc 1 ui 11 J \ of requires an interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Such 
i- *•< i: . : •- {. ,\. i o w w ;*>r correctness However, a 
trial court's rulings regardin*x admissibiI - J. > 1111m in 11 n 1111111• i1 m1111 • it 
1
 \ appears that the low /i rourt w ,h m crroi/"1 Similarly, the detennination of whether 
expert testimony is i c^un u io establish that a product was defective and a proximate cause 
of injui ies is a legal qi lestioni e1 iev • edfoi con ectness u "Itisonl} in the most obvious cases 
that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of i ising expei t testimony tc p i oi e 
causation."13 
Jrivservalioii uriow ; MIS, I ail agrees with Dr. Keiter's statement that this issue was 
properly raised belov • 
3. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant' s post trial motion % * • I 
in uiv nght most favorable to plaintiff, was there sufficient evidence to support ?he v crdict? 
1
 V. //. by & ex rci Robinson v /?/v//: • /. • ^ ' ' • ' 
and quotation iiiarks omitted), 
1
 . v v / ' , o i>aiju<"' <<"»<y, - Inc. 2QQnXJT App 4 0 6 , 1 23, 176P .3d446 ,452 ; 
1
 "Id. (citation aiid quotation ib ;: • -;• *;• .' 
3 
Standard of review: "When a party challenges a trial court's denial of a motion for 
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence, we follow one standard of review: We reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict."14 
Preservation below: Mrs. Call agrees with Dr. Keiter's statement that this issue was 
properly raised below. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code § 78B-3-404(l): 
A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect, or occurrence. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-819(l): 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, 
direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from 
suit, and to any other person identified under Subsection 
78B-5-821(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to 
allocate fault. 
'"Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, \ 33, 31 P.3d 557, 569 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
4 
Utah Code § 78B-5-821(4): 
Fault may not be allocated to a non-party unless a part} tin^ 
files a description of the factual and legal, basis on which fault 
can be allocated and information identifying the non-party, to 
the extent known or reasonably available to the party, inc 1 uditig 
name, address, telephone number and employer. The part\ shaH 
file the description and identifying information in accordance 
with Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or as ordered by the 
court but in no event later than 90 days before trial as provided 
in Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
S rA'lEMEJNT OF THE CA SE 
A. . mature of the Case 
This is a civil case involving a claim of medical malpractice. 
n
 Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
I "'laiiitiff commenced 1 1 lis actioi i oi i Octobei 18, 2002, b> serving a notice of intent to 
commence action on Dr. Ke i t er l \»n d f i I -. • d 
Dr. Keiter moved for summary judgment asserting plaintiffs claims were ban'ed by 
the statuu. oi imitations.17 Plaintiffs response to the motion18 asserted; 
Contrai y to the dt - .-on, ami c s 
attempt to miscoiioL*^ ,*><, bases ofplaimu - t 
him, plaintiffs claims are not based upon any o I \ . . . s 
actions which occurred prior to October 18, 2000. ln^ 
l5R. 267f 21. 
16R. 1-7. 
17K. 413-415. 
18R. 57VMI. 
bases of all of plaintiffs claims against the defendant stem 
entirely from the surgeries that the defendant performed for 
plaintiff on December 18, 2000; August 27, 2001; October 15, 
2001; and the care (not) provided after those surgeries.19 
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment as to the claims asserted by 
plaintiff (those regarding negligent care and treatment occurring after December 18,2000), 
but granted it as to "Plaintiffs claims, if any," prior to that date.20 The order on the motion21 
and an order following the pre-trial conference22 recognized that reference to treatment prior 
to December 18, 2000, might be necessary to give background and explain the reasons for 
the treatment after that date, and included provisions to prevent any prejudice from necessary 
references to treatment prior to December 18, 2000. 
The case was tried to a jury on January 14-15, 17-18, and 22, 2008.23 The jury 
rendered a verdict for plaintiff.24 Defendant John E. Keiter, M.D.'s Motion for Judgement 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for a New Trial was filed February 29,2008.25 
19R. 584. 
20R.69L 
2lR. 692. 
22R.931. 
23R. 1128-1129, 1145-1146, 1158-1159, 1160-1161, 1219-1220. 
24R. 1215-1217. 
25R. 1287-1289. 
A judgment was entered March 6,2008,26 and an amended judgment, correcting an error in 
the amount of future economic damages, was entered April 4, 2008.27 Dr. Keiter's post-
judgment motions were denied by the Order on Pending Motions entered December 3, 
2008.28 
C. Statement of Facts 
Sharlene Call was bom with a condition known as pectus excavatum, commonly 
referred to as sunken chest syndrome.29 Her first surgery to treat that condition occurred 
when she was three years old.30 She first sought and received treatment from Dr. Keiter in 
1981.31 Dr. Keiter's treatment included a surgical revision of the prior pectus excavatum 
surgery and bilateral breast augmentation using silicone implants which occurred on July 6, 
1981.32 In Mrs. Call's view, the 1981 surgery seemed to go okay.33 
26R. 1352-1354. 
27R. 1419-1425. 
28R. 1801-1803. 
29Transcript vol. I, p. 126. 
™Id. 
3lId. p. 127. 
32See Transcript vol. Ill p. 621. 
33Transcript vol. I, p. 128. 
7 
Mrs. Call experienced no particular problems with the implants until 1995. The body 
encapsulates implants with a capsule of scar tissue,34 and Dr. Keiter would periodically 
squeeze the implant and break the tissue.35 In 1995 an individual greeted Mrs. Call with a 
hug and she felt a pop in her breast, and she assumed it had popped the tissue just like Dr. 
Keiter had periodically done.36 Later, she felt some lumpiness and one particular big lump 
and went to see Dr. Keiter about it.37 
On May 19,1995, Dr. Keiter confirmed that the left silicone implant had ruptured, and 
on May 25, 1995, he removed both right and left silicone implants. He also attempted to 
remove the silicone material which had extravasated from the implants into the surrounding 
breast tissues.38 Later, in July 1999, Dr. Keiter performed left breast surgery to remove 
additional silicone material and the inflammatory reactive tissue which had formed in 
response.39 
On November 27,2000, Mrs. Call sought treatment from Dr. Keiter because she had 
noticed a small, discolored hole on her left breast.40 On December 18, 2000, Dr. Keiter 
34Transcript vol. II, p. 316. 
35Transcript vol. I, p. 129. 
36Id. See also Transcript vol. IV, p. 735 (such a hug could break an implant). 
37Transcript vol. I, p. 129. 
38Transcript vol. Ill, p. 528. 
39SeeId.?. 541. 
40Transcript vo. I, pp. 131-132. 
8 
performed a surgery in which he removed the left saline implant, attempted to clean it, 
replaced the same implant back in the left breast, and attempted to close the wound at the site 
of the small, discolored hole.41 
The pathology from the surgery of December 18, 2000, revealed a staph infection.42 
The wound did not heal, and on December 28, 2000, Mrs. Call returned for further 
treatment.43 Describing the condition of the wound, she testified, "It was gross. It - the hole 
opened back up, it was pusy, it was yellow, it smelled really bad[.]"44 She described the hole 
in her breast as somewhere between the size of a quarter and a 50 cent piece.45 She further 
testified that as Dr. Keiter attempted to remove the implant: 
He reached, he took the needle, he put the needle in to release 
the fluid from the implant, and he hit a pocket of infection. And 
pus and green and yellow and goo went everywhere. It went all 
over him, it went all over my husband, it went all over me, it just 
- and it just flew all over everything. And he admitted at that 
time, Oh, there was - there's the problem, it?s a pocket of 
infection.46 
41Plaintiffs Exhibit 9. 
42Plaintiff s exhibit 11; Transcript vol. II, p. 344. 
43Transcript vol. I, p. 136. 
"Id. 
45Id.p. 137. 
46itf.p. 136. 
9 
Although Dr. Keiter removed the saline implant from the left breast, using the existing 
infected hole, he did not remove the infected breast tissue.47 Mrs. Call had three days 
remaining of a prior antibiotic prescription, and he told her to complete that medication.48 
He did not, however, prescribe any new medications.49 
Following this surgery, the wound still did not heal, but Dr. Keiter told her that it 
would take some time and to be patient.50 Mrs. Call described her condition as follows: 
I was very, very discouraged. I was having night sweats. I was 
running a fever. I was in constant pain. It - it was leaking. It was 
just - it was green and it was leaking and I was changing that 
bandage like every two hours. It was leaking through - because 
at work, I couldn't lift, I couldn't -1 was really discouraged. And 
sometimes it leaked to the point - if I didn't get in and change it 
on time, it would actually leak through my bra, through my shirt 
at work, so I began wearing a sweater or something over my 
shirt just in case it ever leaked.51 
She also testified: 
But also, if I was at work or I was somewhere else, and 
I leaned forward, it would - and with my clothes on - it would 
make this sound like - like a - like air got in there. So then the 
air would get - you could hear the sound, and I don't know if 
anybody else could hear the sound, I could hear the sound, it 
would swoosh, this big swoosh of air in there, and then when I 
47Transcript vol. II, pp. 347-48. 
48Transcript vol. I, p. 138. 
49Id. 
50/</.pp. 139-140. 
5lId. p. 140. 
10 
stood back up or resumed my position, it would kind of (making 
sounds) - you know, because the air would kind of pop out of 
it.52 
She was finally able to get in to see Dr. Keiter in February 2001, and he told her to 
just take peroxide and Q-tips to clean out the wound,53 which was two to three inches deep54 
with an opening the size of a 50 cent piece.55 
On August 27, 2001, Dr. Keiter inserted a new saline implant in the left breast. This 
implant became infected and the tissue broke down in the same area as before. This implant 
was removed in an office procedure on October 15, 2001. 
Plaintiffs medical expert was Robert Miner, M.D., a board certified plastic surgeon 
who had practiced in that speciality for approximately thirty years.56 Dr. Miner testified in 
summary as follows: 
a. In late November and early December 2000, it was clear that Sharlene 
Call's left breast implant was becoming exposed due to infection.57 
52Id.p. 141. 
53/</.p. 143. 
54Id.p. 141, 142. 
55Id. p. 142. 
56Transcript vol. II, 293:5-12. 
57See id. at 325:9-326:17. 
11 
b. The necrotic center and gray skin were classic signs of the implant 
becoming exposed due to infection.58 
c. It was negligence on Dr. Keiter's part not to recognize that the skin 
breakdown and extrusion of the implant were caused by infection.59 (Dr. Keiter claimed that 
the hole in Ms. Call's skin was a bug bite.60) 
d. The implant should have been removed on December 18,2000, due to 
infection, and it was a breach of the standard of care not to do so.61 
e. It was a breach of the standard of care to clean and replace the infected 
implant on December 18, 2000.62 
f. It was a breach of the standard of care not to do a capsulectomy to 
remove the tissue that was a host for infection63 
g. It was a breach of standard of care to not put a drain in the breast on 
December 18, 2000.64 
s
*See id. at 338:16 -339:22. 
59See id. at 343:19 -344:5. 
60Seeid. at 337:1-7. 
6iSeeid. at 344:22-346:3. 
62Seeid. at 346:4-19; 347:24-348:11. 
63See id. at 344:22 -346:3. 
"See id. at 344:22-346:3. 
12 
h. Merely irrigating the breast pocket was clearly inadequate to deal with 
the infection.65 This was proven by the fact that on December 28, 2000, only ten days after 
replacing a contaminated implant into a breast pocket that had not been adequately treated 
for infection, the implant was lost as a result of infection.66 
i. Dr. Keiter's failure to do an adequate cleansing of the breast pocket left 
a nidus or nest of infection in the breast.67 The proof of this is the fact that it took 4-5 months 
for superficial closure of the wound to occur, and then the infection came right back after the 
implant surgery in late August 2001.68 
j . Dr. Keiter's method of treating the infection following removal of the 
implant in December 28, 2000, and the new implant surgery in August 2001, was a breach 
of the standard of care.69 (After the August 2001 surgery, Dr. Keiter gave Sharlene Call Q-
tips and peroxide and sent her home.70) Dr. Keiter's treatment of the infection was negligent 
for the following reasons: 
i. The methods of drainage were inadequate;71 
65See id at 346:4-23. 
66See id. at 346:4-23. 
67See id. at 344:22-346:19. 
6
*See id. at 346:4-23. 
69Seeid. at 349:8-350:8. 
70Transcript vol. I, p. 143. 
71
 See Transcript vol. II, 344:22-346:3. 
13 
ii. There should have been a real drain placed in the breast, not just 
leakage over a period of months;72 
iii. There should have been a culture to identify the infecting 
organism, but there was no culture done after removal of the implant on October 15,2001 ;73 
iv. There should have been antibiotics prescribed which were 
specific to what the culture revealed, but there were no antibiotics prescribed after removal 
of the implant on Dec. 28, 2000, or after removal in October 2001.74 
v. Any antibiotics prescribed by Dr. Keiter were ineffective because 
they could not reach the implant.75 
vi. Dr. Keiter effectively abandoned Sharlene Call, who was an 
established patient, by refusing to make appointments or return calls when Mrs. Call 
complained of foul discharge from the wound;76 
vii. Dr. Keiter ignored the dynamics of an infected wound, that is, 
a narrow skin opening often heals superficially, leaving undrained bacteria beneath;77 
See id, at 344:22-346:3. 
Plaintiff Ex. 4 p. 2. 
transcript vol. II, 349:8-350:8. 
'See id. at 362:23-363:15. 
'See id at 349:8-350:8. 
'See id at 338:2-339:22; Plaintiff Ex. 6 p. 2. 
14 
viii. Dr. Keiter failed to use diagnostic tools such as CT scan in his 
treatments of Mrs. Call.78 
Dr. Miner further testified that bacteria hang around and are opportunistic.79 He 
testified that even if the wound superficially heals, if the breast pocket is not adequately 
cleaned, the infection is still percolating inside.80 For this reason, the August 2001 surgery 
was destined to fail and it did fail due to infection.81 
Dr. Miner testified that the negligence of the defendant caused deformity in the left 
breast, left Mrs. Call ill, in pain, and infected for months, caused her to undergo unnecessary 
and failed surgeries, and caused weakness and limitations in activities.82 The failed surgery 
of August 27, 2001, also resulted in the loss of quality of life, including the loss of quality 
of an irreplaceable experience while on a trip for her twenty-fifth wedding anniversary.83 Dr. 
Miner testified as to the surgical alternatives available to restore breast symmetry and the 
costs associated with those alternatives.84 
nSeeid at 352:6-353:2. 
19See id. at 344:6-21. 
™See id. at 344:6-353:2. 
u
 See id at 350:9-351:7. 
S2Seeid. at 351:8-352:6; 353:8-354:1. 
83Plaintiff s ex. 4 p. 2. 
84Transcript vol. II, 354:2-354:12; 358:16-359:1. 
15 
It was undisputed that the infection returned and the implant was exposed again in 
exactly the same spot after Dr. Keiter performed a repeat implant surgery on August 27, 
2001.85 
Sharlene Call said that the necrotic hole in her infected breast in early December 2000 
was identical to the appearance of the breast in October 2001, when the implant was again 
exposed and removed.86 
The defendant's own expert, Dr. Thomas, admitted on cross examination that the 
description of a black, necrotic center with dying, gray-appearing tissue around it is 
consistent with the implant extruding and being exposed.87 He also admitted that replacing 
the implant carried significant risks for Sharlene Call if an infection existed. Dr. Thomas had 
cleaned and replaced an implant only twice in twenty-two years of practice and only then 
because it was certain that there was no infection.88 
Dr. Keiter asked the trial court to take judicial notice of certain matters pertaining to 
the breast implant class action.89 The trial court took judicial notice of the bankruptcy of 
'See id. at 350:9-351:7. 
Transcript vol. I, pp. 144-46. 
'Transcript vol. IV, p. 778. 
'Id. at pp. 779-80. 
>R. 150-233. 
16 
Dow Corning90 and the creation of a trust in the bankruptcy proceedings to compensate 
plaintiffs in the class action.91 The trial court specifically refused to take judicial notice of 
the class action complaint and its allegations of saline implant defects and damages caused 
from ruptured implants.92 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A two-year statute of limitations applies to this medical malpractice action. Mrs. Call 
commenced her action within two years of the date of the treatment at issue. In making his 
statute of limitations argument, the defendant has resorted to a tortured relation-back 
argument and an attenuated "but for" causation argument. The defendant has 
mischaracterized the plaintiffs claims and evidence as well as the issues which the trial court 
submitted to the jury. 
The jury instructions expressly limited the plaintiffs claim to treatment that was 
within the two-year statute of limitations and precluded consideration of earlier silicone-
related treatment in 1995 and 1999. 
The defendant did not proffer or present any evidence as to liability or causation to 
support an allocation of fault to the silicone implant manufacturers for the implants used in 
90The breast implant was actually manufactured by Surgitech, not Dow Corning. 
Transcript vol 1, p. 91; R. 278. 
91R. 693. 
92R.691. 
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the surgery of 1981. In the absence of such evidence, there was no factual or legal basis to 
submit the fault of the silicone implant manufacturer to the jury. 
In regard to the post-trial motions, the trial court correctly found that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the findings of negligence, causation, and damages and that 
there was no irregularity in the proceedings which would justify a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE EXPOSURE OF THE LEFT BREAST IMPLANT IN LATE 
NOVEMBER 2000 WAS A NEW MEDICAL CONDITION, AND 
THE SURGICAL TREATMENT OF THAT CONDITION 
WHICH BEGAN ON DECEMBER 18, 2000, WAS LESS THAN 
TWO YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF LEGAL 
ACTION. 
A. The December 2000 Surgery and Subsequent Care Related to a New Condition, and 
Was Not Merely a Continuation of Prior Treatment 
Sharlene Call was born with the birth defect known as pectus excavatum. She had her 
first surgery for this condition as a small child. In 1981, Dr. Keiter performed a revision 
surgery for the pectus excavatum condition. As part of the same surgery in 1981, Dr. Keiter 
performed a breast augmentation using silicone implants. In 1995, Mrs. Call noticed a lump 
in her left breast and sought treatment from Dr. Keiter. She related that she had been hugged 
in such a way that she was concerned the implant had ruptured. Dr. Keiter removed both the 
left and right silicone implants in 1995. The left breast implant had ruptured. Dr. Keiter 
advised Mrs. Call that he had done his best to clean out the silicone which had escaped due 
to the rupture, but that she could experience some problems due to residual silicone in her 
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left breast. In 1999, Mrs. Call was again concerned about a lump in her left breast and 
sought treatment from Dr. Keiter. Dr. Keiter removed a silicone granuloma in 1999. This 
history of treatment is essential to an understanding of the new problem which presented in 
December 2000. 
In late November 2000, something new happened. Unlike the lumps which had 
concerned her in 1995 and 1999, Mrs. Call noticed a black hole in her breast at the site of her 
prior surgical incisions. She sought treatment for this condition in late November and early 
December 2000. Dr. Keiter's records refer to the condition as an ulceration. Dr. Keiter 
attempted to heal the ulceration with conservative treatments, but the ulceration did not heal 
and he recommended surgery to deal with the condition. Dr. Keiter described the ulcer as 
"circular and with a necrotic perforated center and surrounding thinning skin."93 The 
ulceration had exposed the left breast implant. As explained in a subsequent surgical report, 
"[S]he experienced an extrusion of her left breast implant through the old transverse scar of 
her original surgery."94 
In response to the skin ulceration and extrusion of the implant, Dr. Keiter performed 
surgery on Mrs. Call's left breast on December 18, 2000. During that surgery, he partially 
deflated the saline implant and removed it. He irrigated the breast pocket from which the 
implant had been removed, and then he reinserted the same implant he had just removed after 
93Plaintiff s Exhibit 9, Operative/Procedure Report, December 18, 2000. 
94Plaintiff s Exhibit 13, Operative/Procedure Report, August 27, 2001. 
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first attempting to clean it. In connection with this surgery, a culture was done which 
revealed a staphylococcus infection in the left breast. 
The surgery of December 18, 2000, failed due to the infection, and the implant was 
removed in an office procedure on December 28,2000, and not replaced. Dr. Keiter did not 
prescribe antibiotics and only counseled Mrs. Call to use Q-tips and hydrogen peroxide to 
clean the area where the ulceration had occurred. Mrs. Call explained at trial that the surgical 
wound through which the implant had been removed oozed pus and was foul smelling for 
months. When she contacted Dr. Keiter's office, the only instructions given were to continue 
to use Q-tips and hydrogen peroxide. 
In August 2001, Dr. Keiter determined that the infection had resolved and it was safe 
to insert a new implant in the left breast, and on August 21, 2001, he inserted a new saline 
implant. That implant was also lost due to infection and was removed by Dr. Keiter in an 
office procedure on October 15, 2001. 
The evidence does not support Dr. Keiter's claim that the December 2000 surgery and 
subsequent care should be characterized as just a continuation of prior care. Dr. Keiter states 
in his brief that he "continued to treat her during this period [from September 1999] through 
January 2000" and advised her she would probably develop additional granulomas.95 The 
supporting record citations are to the memorandum supporting Dr. Keiter's motion for 
Brief of Appellant at 6. 
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summary judgment, and depositions attached to that memorandum. The actual deposition 
testimony described the granulomas as "really a very benign condition."97 The testimony 
does not, however, describe any actual continuing treatment during the September 1999 
through January 2000 time frame,98 and the memorandum confirms that there in fact was no 
treatment from September 1999 through November 27. 2000, a period of approximately 14 
months.99 
Dr. Keiter incorrectly describes the December 2000 surgery as being "surgery to 
remove the granuloma."100 Ms. Call testified, however, that her purpose in seeking treatment 
in November 2000 was to treat a little black hole that had developed in her breast, and that 
Dr. Keiter initially described it as a spider bite that she should just watch for a few days, and 
later as an insect bite.101 
Mrs. Call's presentation of evidence of negligence at trial was limited to those events 
which began on December 18,2000, and continued thereafter until October 15,2001, the last 
time she saw Dr. Keiter as a patient. The condition for which she sought treatment in 
96Id. citing to R. at 264-65, 282. 
97R. 282, deposition page 40 line 11. 
9SId. 
"R. 265 Tf 12. See also Transcript vol. IV, p. 742 (Defendant's expert, Dr. Thomas, 
testified that Mrs. Call did well for a period of time after the December 1999 surgery). 
100Brief of Appellant, 6. 
101Transcript vol. I, pp. 131-132. 
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December 2000, was a new condition. The statute of limitations cannot begin to run until 
the occurrence of the negligent act.102 The surgeries and procedures of December 18,2000, 
December 28,2000, August 21,2001, and October 15,2001, and the lack of proper care for 
infection during that entire period were distinct events upon which Mrs. Call based her legal 
action. The evidence of negligence included expert testimony which made the following key 
points: 1) the ulceration and extrusion of the implant in December 2000, was caused by 
infection; 2) Dr. Keiter failed to recognize that infection was the cause of the ulceration and 
extrusion of the implant; 3) Dr. Keiter failed to adequately clean the infected breast tissues 
on December 18 and December 28,2000; 4) the contaminated implant should not have been 
reused on December 18, 2000; 5) the post surgical treatment of the infection was 
substandard; 6) he neglected and abandoned an existing patient; and 7) the new implant in 
August 2001 was doomed to failure because he had not properly treated the infection. 
The claims for negligence and damages which occurred between December 18,2000 
and October 15, 2001, were commenced well within the bounds of the applicable statutory 
time period specified in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. According to the Act, a 
malpractice action against a health care provider must be "commenced within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs."103 Mrs. Call's action was therefore timely. 
mSee Utah Code § 78B-3-404(l). 
103UtahCode§78B-3-404(l). 
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B. No Damages Were Awarded for any Negligence Beyond the Statute of Limitations 
Period. 
Dr. Keiter's argument regarding the statute of limitations hinges on a tortured relation-
back argument and an attenuated "but for" causation argument. The trial court's rulings and 
instructions correctly disposed of these arguments. A pre-trial order expressly limited the 
presentation of the evidence of negligence and causation of injury to the period December 
18, 2000 to October 15, 2000.104 The evidentiary rulings during trial gave full effect to this 
limitation on the evidence. The court then instructed the jury not to consider any treatment 
prior to December 18, 2000 and not to consider any damage caused by silicone through the 
following jury instructions: 
Instruction No. 29 
Plaintiff claims that the care she received from Dr. Keiter on and 
after December 18, 2000 was negligent. Any information or 
evidence presented regarding care Plaintiff received from Dr. 
Keiter prior to December 18, 2000 has been presented for 
background information only. You are not to consider this 
information as part of Plaintiff s claims in this case. 
Instruction No. 30 
In determining whether or not defendant was negligent in this 
case, you are not to consider any claims or allegations related to 
damage or injuries caused by silicone, including any claims 
regarding retained silicone, removed silicone or future care 
related to silicone, prior to December 18, 2000. 
R. 1193-1194. 
104R.931. 
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The law presumes that the jury followed the instructions.105 Dr. Keiter has not 
challenged any of the instructions on appeal. This Court should conclude, therefore, that the 
jury did not award damages for any harm that was done prior to December 18,2000, whether 
related to silicone or not. 
While it is true that plaintiff presented evidence concerning the surgeries and 
treatment prior to December 18, 2000, that was necessary to show that Dr. Keiter was 
familiar with Ms. Call's condition and should have recognized that the problems in 
December 2000 were caused by infection. Thus, Dr. Miner testified that the scar tissue 
capsule was not removed when the silicone implant was removed106 because that was 
relevant to the care that was provided or not provided in December 2000 and after.107 For 
example, in explaining that Dr. Keiter should have recognized the presence of infection on 
December 18, 2000, Dr. Miner explained that because this was a recurring problem, "a bell 
has to go off and say, hey, something else is going on."108 The trial court was very careful, 
mMoore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981); Ryan 
v. Beaver County, 82 Utah 27,32,21 P.2d 858, 859 (1933); Paxton v. Spencer, 71 Utah 313, 
327, 265 P. 751, 756 (1928). 
106Transcript vol. II, pages 319-20. 
mId. pages 337-39. 
mId pp. 344-45. See also Id. p. 347. 
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however, to insure that the testimony related only to history, not to negligence beyond the 
statute of limitations.109 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, and despite the defendant's attempt to 
misconstrue the bases of plaintiff s claims against him, the evidence of negligence which was 
presented at trial related solely to the treatment from December 18, 2000 through October 
15, 2000. Therefore, since Sharlene Call commenced this action on October 18, 2002, 
plaintiffs claims are well-within the two-year statutory time limitation allowed under the 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
C. Mrs. Call did not attempt to extend her claims beyond the statute of limitations 
period. 
It is important to understand what this case is not. This is not a case where a plaintiff 
commences action more than two years after the primary negligent act, and invokes some 
legal doctrine to assert the action is nonetheless timely. An example of such a case is Seale 
v. Gowans,110 where the plaintiff filed an action in 1991 claiming additional damages from 
negligence that occurred in 1987 and was discovered in 1988. Another example is Collins 
v. Wilson,111 where the claimed negligent surgery occurred May 11, 1989, but the doctor 
continued with follow-up treatment (primarily authorizing prescription refills) through March 
mId. pp. 330-31, 333. 
110923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
l l l1999UT56,984P.2d960. 
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1991; the complaint was filed March 24, 1993. Another case is Harper v. Evans,112 where 
the claim was that treatment was ongoing and the statute of limitations did not begin until the 
final negligent act. Because Dr. Keiter has placed particular emphasis on Harper, the 
particulars of that case will be examined. 
The real issue in Harper was whether a complaint that was specifically focused on 
two particular surgeries could later be expanded, after a motion for summary judgment was 
filed, to include a claim of negligent post-surgical care.l n The Harper complaint specifically 
identified two surgeries, on November 15 and 16, 2002, "as the only treatment at issue 
provided by [the defendants]."114 It was only after the defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the statute of limitations that Harpers first claimed "that Defendants' negligence 
occurred not during the original surgeries, but instead over the course of Evans's follow-up 
care."115 The Harper trial court found that the claim accrued on the date of the last surgery, 
November 16,2002, and that, after applying statutory tolling provisions associated with the 
prelitigation process, the statute of limitations expired January 11,2006. Harper's complaint 
filed on January 17,2006, was, therefore, filed beyond the statute of limitations. On appeal, 
Harper argued that the date of last treatment in April 2003 should be used as the date the 
1122008 UT App 165, 185 P.3d 573. 
U3Seeid.at^6. 
ll4W.at1f5. 
115/</.atT|6. 
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cause of action accrued pursuant to the continuous negligent treatment rule. The Court of 
Appeals rejected that argument on the basis that the courts will not look at facts outside of 
those alleged in the complaint to invoke the rule. Harper also argued that she had not 
discovered the negligence until September 2003. The Court of Appeals rejected that 
argument on the basis that Harper had not raised this issue in the trial court.116 The summary 
judgment based on the statute of limitations was affirmed. Harper thus addresses adequacy 
of pleading and adequacy of raising an issue in the trial court. 
In the instant case, in contrast, the complaint was not limited to specific surgeries. 
The complaint instead alleged generally that Dr. Keiter provided care to Mrs. Call and that 
"Dr. Keiter deviated from the standard of care required of a plastic surgeon and was 
negligent as to the manner of care provided to the plaintiff."117 Defendant has not claimed 
that this allegation did not encompass the care Dr. Keiter gave on and after December 18, 
2000. Although Mrs. Call's medical condition involves treatment from time to time over a 
period of more than 18 years, the events for which Mrs. Call asked the jury to award damages 
all occurred within the limitations period. 
It is Dr. Keiter, not Mrs. Call, who seeks to invoke the continuous negligent treatment 
rule so he can then shoot it down because it was not pleaded in the complaint. In seeking to 
invoke the rule, Dr. Keiter has resorted to an illogical and attenuated causation argument in 
116There was also a thorough discussion of the tolling provisions of the Utah 
Healthcare Malpractice Act which have no bearing on the present case. Id. at ffif 17-21. 
117R.2,1J13. 
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an effort to relate-back the surgery of December 18,2000, to prior treatment so as to impose 
an earlier statute of limitations commencement date, and then argue that the surgeries and 
care that were within the limitations period are somehow barred by the statute of limitations. 
Ms. Call's surgeries in 1995 and 1999 to remove the silicone from the ruptured 
implants were not the proximate cause of the injuries which occurred in 2000 and 2001. 
Even though the extrusion of the saline implant in December 2000 may not have resulted 
"but for" the silicone implants rupturing in 1995, this chain of causation is too attenuated to 
be actionable.118 The treatment prior to December 2000 was only an indirect cause119 in the 
sense that Mrs. Call had repeated surgeries which involved incisions at the site of the "old 
transverse scar of her original surgery"120 and the skin ulcerated at that location, allowing the 
implant to extrude. 
The damages in this case are all about the infection and the loss of the implant, not 
about the ongoing formation of silicone granulomas. That is what was submitted to the 
jury.121 Mrs. Call's left breast became horribly infected because Dr. Keiter did not clean out 
118
"A causal connection that is too attenuated . . . would not justify an award for 
damages." Aris Vision Inst, Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., 2006 UT 45, ^  19, 143 P.3d 278, 
283. 
119
"An indirect cause is a cause of a cause. It is a cause which sets in operation an 
active cause." Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 94 Utah 570, 576, 80 P.2d 348, 
352(1938). 
120Plaintiff s ex. 13. 
mSee Instruction No. 30, quoted above at page 23, which insured no damages were 
awarded related to retained silicone. 
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the infection properly on either December 18 or 28,2000, he reused a contaminated implant 
which promulgated further infection of the left breast, and he failed to give proper care for 
the infection after the removal of the implant on December 28,2000. As a result, Mrs. Call 
suffered pain and anguish, disfigurement, and loss of physical function from the prolonged 
infection. Also, Mrs. Call underwent an expensive and painful surgery on August 21,2000, 
which was doomed to failure due to the smoldering and unresolved infection in the left 
breast. As of the time of trial, Mrs. Call had still not had a new implant placed, and plaintiff 
presented expert testimony of the surgical alternatives and costs to achieve symmetry in her 
breasts. 
Based on information that Mrs. Call received during the discovery process, she 
believes that Dr. Keiter also committed acts of negligence for which the statute of limitations 
was a bar, but the fact that she did not file an earlier malpractice action does not preclude her 
from making a timely filing for new acts of negligence. In other words, where a physician 
commits a new act of negligence, a timely claim for damages is not barred solely because no 
claim was made for the earlier negligence. 
Neither the continuous negligent treatment rule nor the discovery rule apply to the 
present case. Mrs. Call does not claim that the treatment from December 18, 2000 through 
October 18, 2001, is part of continuous negligent treatment that began either in 1995 or in 
1999. She claims that the infection which caused the implant to extrude in December 2000 
was distinct and not comparable to the lump (silicone granuloma) which was excised in 1999. 
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II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT THE 
ISSUE OF FAULT OF THE MANUFACTURERS OF THE 
SILICONE IMPLANTS USED BY DR. KEITER IN THE 1981 
SURGERY, 
The silicone implants in question were placed by Dr. Keiter in a surgery which 
occurred in 1981. The implant in the Mrs. Call's left breast was in place for approximately 
14 years until Dr. Keiter removed it in 1995. In 1995, Sharlene Call gave Dr. Keiter a history 
of a change in the implant and a resulting lump in the breast following a hard hug from an 
acquaintance.122 It is a matter of common experience that medical products have a life 
expectancy and will not last forever. Prosthetic hips and knees and many other medical 
devices are known to have a limited life expectancy. The silicone implant from 1981 had a 
life expectancy. To assert otherwise is to argue that the implant would be defective if it did 
not last a lifetime. 
The evidence presented by Dr. Keiter's expert, Dr. Thomas, was that the implants 
used in 1981 had a similar life expectancy as those used today.123 Dr. Thomas testified that 
the implants were not defective, and he described the concern over the safety of silicone 
implants as a big "hub-bub" in the media.124 He explained that silicone implants were studied 
during a period of moratorium of use and were found to have a 12-15 year life expectancy.125 
122Transcript vol. I, p. 129. 
123Transcript vol. IV, pp. 733-734. 
124W.at733. 
125/t/.at734. 
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Utah has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A126 which sets forth what must 
be proved in order to establish that a product is defective. Restatement § 402 A requires that 
the defect exist as of the date the product was placed into the stream of commerce. This 
means that in order to submit the issue of fault to the jury in this case, the defendant would 
have to prove that the implant as sold in 1981 should have lasted longer than 14 years before 
rupturing or that some other defect existed. In addition, the proof would have to include that 
the defect was the cause of medical injury.127 Both elements of proof require expert 
testimony. 
The mere fact that the silicone implant in Mrs. Call's left breast did not withstand a 
hard hug and ruptured after 14 years in place and leaked silicone into her breast tissues does 
not establish that this medical product was defective and that any defect caused her injuries. 
Unless the reasonable life expectancy or other characteristics of the silicone implant are 
within the common experience of jurors, competent expert testimony was required to 
establish that Mrs. Call's left breast implant was defective and unreasonably dangerous.128 
l26Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). 
lllFitz v. Synthes, 199 UT 103, f 11; 990 P.2d 391. 
mBenedict v. Zirnrner, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (Dist. N. Iowa 2005) ("Any 
decision which pertains to the design of the device [an artificial hip] involves engineering, 
metallurgical and medical principles beyond common knowledge and experience. Whether 
the device had a design defect, whether the foreseeable risks of harm the device posed could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design and whether 
the omission of such design rendered the device not reasonably safe are technical, scientific 
issues that cannot be fully understood by the average juror without some expert assistance."). 
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There is no such evidence in the record. There is no reference in Dr. Keiter's statement of 
facts to evidence admitted at trial regarding the fault of the manufacturer of the silicone 
implants which were used by Dr. Keiter in his surgery on Mrs. Call in 1981. Despite this 
omission in the statement of facts, Dr. Keiter makes the unsupported assertion, "As was well-
established at trial, Ms. Call's silicone breast implants were defective "129 The footnoted 
references to the testimony which purportedly support this statement do nothing of the kind, 
as a brief review of the references will demonstrate: 
R. 1819: 280 Dr. Carabine, a subsequent treating physician, states that Mrs. 
Call has residual silicone in her breast. 
R. 1819:316-317 Dr. Miner, Mrs. Call's expert, states that when the silicone 
implant breaks down and the breast capsule130 which has formed 
to surround the implant breaks down, free silicone gel will get 
into the breast tissues. 
R. 1819: 323-324 Dr. Miner states that Mrs. Call's silicone implants ruptured and 
had to be removed. 
R. 1819:385 Dr. Miner states that there had to be a leak, otherwise there 
would be no silicone in the breast tissue. 
R. 1820:458-459 Mrs. Call explained that she received compensation from a class 
action lawsuit regarding silicone implants. 
R. 1820: 461-466 Mrs. Call testified that she believed that the money was paid by 
the manufacturers because the silicone implants were defective. 
129 Brief of Appellant, p. 30. 
130Reactive (scar) tissue which forms around any foreign object in the body, including 
a breast implant. R. 1819: 1316. 
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R. 1820: 526 Dr. Keiter stated that he diagnosed a rupture in the silicone 
implant in Mrs. Call's left breast. 
R. 1820: 539 Dr. Keiter testified that he told Mrs. Call she could expect 
further granulomas due to the silicone in her breast. 
R. 1820: 614-615 Dr. Keiter testified that in the 90's they discovered that 80-90% 
or more of the silicone implants used in prior years were 
leaking. 
R. 1821: 715 Dr. Faucett, a subsequent treating physician, testified that Mrs. 
Call gave him a history of a ruptured silicone implant with 
subsequent formation of granulomas in her left breast. 
R. 1821:731 Dr. Thomas, Dr. Keiter's expert witness, testified that Mrs. Call 
had a silicone granuloma which was indicative of a leak from 
the silicone implants used in 1981. 
R. 1821:735-36 Dr. Thomas discussed how long it takes for a silicone granuloma 
to form. 
R. 1821: 740 Dr. Thomas discussed the July 1999 surgery to remove silicone 
granulomas. 
R. 1821:767 Dr. Thomas discussed Dr. Carrabine's treatment of silicone 
granulomas due to leaking silicone. 
R. 1821: 816-17 Mrs. Call discussed in a general way the fact that she had 
silicone which leaked into her left breast tissue. 
The referenced testimony establishes only that the implants leaked and Mrs. Call 
received compensation from a class action in which it was claimed that the implants were 
defective. This does not constitute sufficient evidence to establish fault by the manufacturer. 
The only witnesses who were potentially qualified to comment on the fault of the 
manufacturer were the physicians, and none of them gave any testimony that the silicone 
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implants were defective. The only witness who even discussed the issue of defect was Mrs. 
Call, who is unqualified to testify as to fault by the manufacturer. All Mrs. Call could say, 
as a lay witness, is that she participated in a class action suit which was based on a claim of 
defect, therefore, she understood the payment to be an admission by the manufacturer that 
the silicone implants were defective. It would have been plain error to submit the fault of 
the manufacturer to the jury with the sole evidence being the payment of the money in the 
class action.131 
By contrast, the defendant's expert, Dr. Thomas, testified that the implants were not 
defective and had lasted for the period of their reasonable life expectancy. 
Plaintiff did not put on any evidence that the silicone implants used in the 1981 
surgery and removed in 1995 were defective. The fact that money was paid into a settlement 
trust does not establish that this medical product was defective.132 
Based on this evidence, there was no factual or legal basis, as required by statute, 
upon which to submit the issue of the fault of the manufacturers of the silicone implants.133 
13
 ^ h e trial court specifically refused to take judicial notice of the class action 
complaint and its allegations of saline implant defects and damages caused from ruptured 
implants. R. 691. 
mMcInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240,249 (1st Cir. 1985) (Fact of settlement with 
third party not admissible to prove causation. "An innocent third party may settle, even for 
a large amount, merely to avoid the burdens of litigation."). See also Beights v. W. R. Grace 
& Co., 67 F.R.D. 81,86 (W.D. Okla. 1975) ("the settlement did not establish that the product 
involved was in fact defective and responsible for the accident"). 
133UtahCode §§ 78B-6-819, 821. 
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Ill: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL MOTIONS. 
Dr. Keiter relies on the wrong standard of review in arguing error in the denial of his 
post-judgment motion for a directed verdict. Dr. Keiter cites to a case involving the grant 
of a directed verdict.134 The standard for review for the denial of a direct verdict, and the 
associated obligation of marshaling the evidence, was explained by the Utah Supreme Court 
as follows: 
When a party challenges a trial court's denial of a motion 
for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, we follow one 
standard of review: We reverse only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, 
this standard obligates the appealing party to marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict. In other words, demonstrating insufficiency of 
the evidence requires an appealing party to show that all the 
evidence in favor of the verdict cannot support the verdict.135 
Because Dr. Keiter has failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict in 
favor of Ms. Call, the denial of Dr. Keiter's motions should be summarily affirmed.136 
Moreover, if the Court chooses to address the motions notwithstanding the lack of 
u
*Management Comm. ofGraystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n on behalf of Owners 
of Condominiums v. Gray stone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
U5Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, U 33, 31 P.3d 557, 569 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
mHill v. Estate of Alfred, 2009 UT 28, \ 69; Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames 
Kraemerf LLC, 2009 UT 7, fj[ 46, 49, 210 P.3d 263, 272. 
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marshaling, the analysis of the evidence below confirms that the denial of those motions was 
correct. 
Dr. Keiter first argues that Ms. Call's damages were caused by the leaked silicone and 
the claims were therefore barred by the statute of limitations. This argument is addressed 
above in Point I. 
Dr. Keiter then argues that Ms. Call "failed to demonstrate that her injuries were 
caused by Dr. Keiter's treatment" because the evidence at trial, according to Dr. Keiter, 
"showed that Ms. Call's injuries could just as easily have resulted from the leaked silicone 
or the earlier surgeries . . . ,"137 This ignores the evidence that plaintiffs expert, Dr. Miner, 
had presented on the breaches of the standard of care by Dr. Keiter which caused injuries to 
Mrs. Call. He specifically testified that Dr. Keiter should have installed a sump drain to 
completely eliminate the infection prior to giving her another implant.138 He further testified 
that it was a departure from, the standard of care to rinse off and reinsert a contaminated 
implant.139 He also testified that the post-operative care was "at best abominable because 
there wasn't any."140 Finally, he testified that the substandard care had caused damages.141 
7BriefofAppellantat39. 
^Transcript vol. II, p. 345. 
'/J. at 346, 348-49. 
}Id. at 350. 
[E.g.,id. at 351-53, 358-59. 
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Because there was evidence to support the verdict, this Court should affirm the denial of the 
motion for directed verdict and the post-judgment motions. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's rulings on evidence and the jury instructions insured that the damages 
awarded were limited to the surgeries of December 2000 and the subsequent care. The action 
was commenced well within the statutory two-year time of those events, and the trial court 
properly denied the motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations. Defendant 
did not present a legal or factual basis, supported by expert testimony, to show that plaintiffs 
prior silicone implant was a cause of the damages awarded. The denial of the post-judgment 
motions was proper. This Court should affirm the trial court judgment in all respects. 
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